The Judges' Book
Volume 6

Article 13

2022

International Law: Prosecuting Foreign States
Chimène I. Keitner

Follow this and additional works at: https://repository.uchastings.edu/judgesbook
Part of the Judges Commons

Recommended Citation
Keitner, Chimène I. (2022) "International Law: Prosecuting Foreign States," The Judges' Book: Vol. 6,
Article 13.
Available at: https://repository.uchastings.edu/judgesbook/vol6/iss1/13

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by UC Hastings Scholarship Repository. It has been
accepted for inclusion in The Judges' Book by an authorized editor of UC Hastings Scholarship Repository. For
more information, please contact wangangela@uchastings.edu.

Vol. 6

The Judges’ Book

89

International Law
Prosecuting Foreign States
Chimène I. Keitner1
Introduction
This chapter summarizes the first comprehensive analysis
of—and answer to—questions about foreign sovereign immunity
from criminal jurisdiction in U.S. courts. In doing so, it upends the
widespread but misleading perception that the Foreign Sovereign
Immunities Act (FSIA) provides the sole basis for exercising
jurisdiction over foreign states in every context. The better view
of current law is that the FSIA neither authorizes nor prohibits
criminal proceedings. Absent further legislation, claims to
immunity from such proceedings will remain a matter of common
law rooted in historical practice and judicial decisions, informed
by Congress’s statutory choices in the civil context.2 Although
foreign states themselves are not generally subject to prosecution
in domestic courts, there is no categorical bar to criminal
proceedings against foreign state-owned enterprises in either
domestic or international law.
Foreign State Immunity and U.S. Law
An analysis of foreign sovereign immunity under U.S. law
begins, but does not end, with the FSIA. Some have seized upon
the fact that the FSIA’s text “does not explicitly limit its grant of
immunity to civil cases”3 to argue that it also shields foreign states
and state-owned entities from criminal jurisdiction. However, to
1

Excerpted and adapted from Chimène I. Keitner, Prosecuting Foreign
States, 61 VA. J. INT’L L. 221 (2021).
2
For additional historical background, see Chimène I. Keitner, Between
Law and Diplomacy: The Conundrum of Common-Law Immunity, 54
GA. L. REV. 217 (2019) (chronicling nineteenth- and early twentiethcentury practice); Chimène I. Keitner, The Forgotten History of Foreign
Official Immunity, 87 N.Y.U. L. REV. 704 (2012) (chronicling late
eighteenth-century practice).
3
RESTATEMENT (FOURTH) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE
UNITED STATES § 451, reporters’ note 4 (2018).
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date, “no reported court decision has dismissed an indictment or
otherwise suppressed a criminal prosecution based on immunity
conferred by the FSIA.”4
The FSIA codifies the restrictive theory of foreign sovereign
immunity, which permits one state to exercise jurisdiction over
another state regarding the defendant’s commercial activities.
Congress enacted the FSIA to facilitate and circumscribe the
exercise of civil jurisdiction over foreign states. Congressman
Hamilton Fish, Jr., who was a member of the House Judiciary
Committee in 1976, recounted that the FSIA was viewed “[f]irst
and foremost . . . as a Federal long-arm statute allowing both the
Federal and State courts to assume in personam jurisdiction over
foreign entities for nongovernmental actions.”5 He explained that
“[t]he intent was to depoliticize commercial and routine legal
disputes involving foreign states” because “when a nation chooses
to enter the marketplace, it should be placed on the same footing
as any other party with respect to legal rights and liabilities.”6
Congress codified the restrictive theory in Title 28, Part IV of
the U.S. Code, which contains rules governing jurisdiction and
venue. Section 1604 provides that “a foreign state shall be immune
from the jurisdiction of the courts of the United States and of the
States except as provided” in the FSIA.7 The absence of the word
“civil” before the word “jurisdiction” has prompted some parties
to argue that the FSIA precludes any exercise of jurisdiction over
foreign states by U.S. courts unless it falls within an explicitly
enumerated exception. The absence of this qualification has not
been explained.8 The most likely explanation is that, because

4

Id.
Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act: Hearing on H.R. 1149, H.R. 1689,
and H.R. 1888 Before the Subcomm. on Admin. L. & Governmental Rels.
of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 100th Cong., 2d sess. (1987).
6
Id.
7
28 U.S.C. § 1604 (emphasis added).
8
Some other countries enacted foreign sovereign immunity statutes that
explicitly exclude criminal proceedings from the scope of the statute,
reinforcing the idea that the codification movement in the 1970s and
1980s focused on civil proceedings against foreign states and their
instrumentalities. See, e.g., State Immunity Act 1978, ch. 33, § 16(4)
(UK); State Immunity Act, R.S.C. 1985, ch. S-18, § 18 (Can.); cf. G.A.
Res. 59/38, at 2 (Dec. 2, 2004) (U.N.) (noting the “general
5
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Congress was focused on issues raised by cross-border
commercial disputes, it did not consider criminal proceedings at
all. The same is true of bankruptcy proceedings, which the Ninth
Circuit has held are not precluded by the FSIA despite § 1604’s
seemingly comprehensive language.9
The core exceptions to the FSIA’s grant of jurisdictional
immunity are codified in § 1605, which provides that “[a] foreign
state shall not be immune from the jurisdiction of courts of the
United States or of the States in any case” that satisfies specified
criteria.10 Consistent with Congress’s intent to codify the
restrictive theory, these criteria include actions based upon “a
commercial activity carried on in the United States by the foreign
state,” “an act performed in the United States in connection with
a commercial activity of the foreign state elsewhere,” or “an act
outside the territory of the United States in connection with a
commercial activity of the foreign state elsewhere and that act
causes a direct effect in the United States.”11
The language of the FSIA sounds in civil, rather than criminal,
procedure. Under the statutory framework created by the FSIA,
§ 1330(a) gives the federal district courts original subject-matter
jurisdiction over any nonjury action against a foreign state where
a statutory exception to immunity applies.12 Section 1330(b)
grants personal jurisdiction over a foreign sovereign “as to every
claim for relief over which the district courts have [original]
jurisdiction” if the defendant has been properly served.13 In this
respect, the FSIA offers civil claimants one-stop shopping for both
personal and subject-matter jurisdiction.

understanding” that the U.N. Convention on Jurisdictional Immunities
of States “does not cover criminal proceedings”).
9
At least one statutory provision outside the FSIA denies immunity to
foreign states in certain circumstances: § 106 of the bankruptcy code. See
Tuli v. Republic of Iraq, 172 F.3d 707 (9th Cir. 1999) (indicating that §
106 abrogates the sovereign immunity of “a governmental unit” in
bankruptcy proceedings, and that § 101(27) defines “a governmental
unit” to include a foreign state or “other foreign or domestic
government”).
10
28 U.S.C. § 1605.
11
Id. § 1605(a)(2).
12
Id. § 1330(a).
13
Id. § 1330(b).
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In 1983, the Supreme Court in Verlinden B.V. v. Central Bank
of Nigeria described the FSIA as providing “a comprehensive set
of legal standards governing claims of immunity in every civil
action against a foreign state or its political subdivisions, agencies,
or instrumentalities.”14 The Court’s frequently cited statement in
Argentine Republic v. Amerada Hess Shipping Corp. that “the text
and structure of the FSIA demonstrate Congress’ intention that the
FSIA be the sole basis for obtaining jurisdiction over a foreign
state in our courts” does not resolve the question of criminal
jurisdiction.15 In that case, the Court considered whether the Alien
Tort Statute (ATS) provides an additional basis for exercising
jurisdiction over civil actions against foreign states.16 The Court
answered no, citing Verlinden for the proposition that Congress
intended the FSIA to provide the “sole basis” for obtaining
jurisdiction over a foreign state in a court in the United States.17
However, the Court did not consider or make any findings about
whether a different statute could provide courts with jurisdiction
over criminal proceedings against a foreign state.
Both Verlinden and Amerada Hess attribute a particular intent
to Congress when it enacted the FSIA—namely, “(1) to endorse
and codify the restrictive theory of sovereign immunity, and (2) to
transfer primary responsibility for deciding claims of foreign
states to immunity from the State Department to the courts.”18
They do not rely solely on the words of the FSIA, but rather
interpret those words in the light of Congress’s intent. It is difficult
to imagine that the enacting Congress silently intended to prevent
U.S. law enforcement from seeking to compel foreign state-owned
enterprises to produce information in connection with criminal
investigations, or to prevent prosecutors from bringing criminal
charges. It is even more difficult to imagine that Congress would
have deprived U.S. courts of jurisdiction over criminal
proceedings initiated by governmental authorities while opening
those same courts to civil litigation initiated by private parties in
commercial disputes.
14

461 U.S. 480, 488 (1983) (emphasis added).
488 U.S. 428, 434 (1989).
16
Id.
17
Id.
18
Samantar v. Yousuf, 560 U.S. 305, 313 (2010) (internal quotation
marks omitted).
15
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There are many contexts in which a foreign bank or other
corporation might find itself on the receiving end of criminal
process in a U.S. court. The question of immunity does not arise
unless the court would otherwise be able to exercise jurisdiction
over the foreign entity. Federal criminal subject-matter
jurisdiction rests on 18 U.S.C. § 3231, which provides the district
courts with original jurisdiction “of all offenses against the laws
of the United States,”19 without regard to the identity or status of
the defendant. Increased prosecutorial attention to cyber
espionage, trade-secret theft, and foreign corrupt practices could
set criminal investigations of foreign entities on a collision course
with potential claims of jurisdictional immunity.
Corporate Liability in Domestic and International Law
Corporations, though “legally deemed to be single entities,
distinct and separate from all the individuals who comprise
them,”20 can act only through natural persons. Standards for
imputing an agent’s acts to the corporation can vary among
jurisdictions, but it is generally accepted that individuals’ actions
can be imputed to the corporation for purposes of liability.
Attribution questions regarding state-owned enterprises
(SOEs) can involve an additional layer. Although domestic law
generally governs the activities of corporations (including foreign
corporations) without regard to the identity of their shareholders,
certain international conduct-regulating rules apply only to state
actors. Further, international law has developed rules governing
when and whether a natural or legal person’s conduct is
attributable to a state. Questions can thus arise about whether a
particular corporation should be treated as a state-owned
enterprise for various purposes, as well as whether that
corporation’s activities are attributable to a foreign state for
purposes of liability. The question of whether corporations
themselves can be held criminally liable also arises in
international law, although domestic law generally provides the
answer.
19

18 U.S.C. § 3231.
Celia Wells, Corporate Criminal Responsibility, in RESEARCH
HANDBOOK ON CORPORATE LEGAL RESPONSIBILITY 147 (Stephen Tully
ed. 2005).
20
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Even though holding a foreign state criminally responsible in
a domestic court is difficult to imagine, the same is not necessarily
true of SOEs. As the U.S. government argued in response to a
Lithuanian shipping company’s motion to quash a grand-jury
subpoena, the customary-international-law principle that a foreign
state itself is not generally “subject to punitive measures” does not
apply to “separate corporate entities even if majority owned by the
state.”21 From a human rights perspective, Camilla Wee has noted
that it could be desirable to hold SOEs to “a higher standard of
human rights observance and protection.”22 Depending on the
circumstances, enforcing such obligations could create
opportunities for imposing punitive measures under domestic
jurisdiction.
The task of characterizing a SOE’s activity as either
commercial or governmental is not as straightforward as it might
at first appear. Professor Anne van Aaken has noted that, with the
rise of sovereign wealth funds (SWFs) and return to SOEs in the
early twenty-first century, “the boundaries between state activities
and commercial activities [have] become blurred.”23 She observes
that, as a general matter, “the legal form of sovereign or public
authority is the first test to be treated like a state, [and] the second
test is always whether a public function is exercised.”24 As van
Aaken emphasizes, this “opens a Pandora’s box to an even bigger
question, namely what public functions are.”25 This problem is
especially acute with respect to corporate entities associated with
planned economies that do not differentiate clearly between
governmental and market activities.

21

Government Response to Lithuanian Shipping Company’s Motion to
Quash Grand Jury Subpoena Dated June 10, 2010, at 12, In re Grand
Jury Proceeding Related to M/V Deltuva, No. 10-223 (D.P.R.).
22
CAMILLA WEE, INT’L COMM’N OF JURISTS, REGULATING THE HUMAN
RIGHTS IMPACT OF STATE-OWNED ENTERPRISES: TENDENCIES OF
CORPORATE ACCOUNTABILITY AND STATE RESPONSIBILITY 16 (2008),
https://tinyurl.com/y5z3d25m.
23
Anne van Aaken, Blurring Boundaries Between Sovereign Acts and
Commercial Activities: A Functional View on Regulatory Immunity and
Immunity from Execution 2 (Univ. of St. Gallen L. Sch., Working Paper
No. 2013-17).
24
Id. at 15.
25
Id. at 15–16.
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The FSIA defines “commercial activity” to mean “either a
regular course of commercial conduct or a particular commercial
transaction or act” and indicates that the commercial character of
an activity shall be determined by reference to its “nature,” rather
than by reference to its “purpose.”26 If a central goal of the
restrictive theory is to put foreign states on the same footing as
private actors when they choose to enter the marketplace, then the
idea of “commercial” activity subject to domestic jurisdiction (in
Latin, acta jure gestionis) can be defined as the type of activity
engaged in by persons that are not sovereign states.
Judicial Approaches to Immunity from Criminal Proceedings
The interaction between evolving notions of corporate
criminal responsibility in domestic law and state responsibility in
international law suggests the need for clearer immunity doctrines
to circumscribe the exercise of criminal jurisdiction by U.S.
courts. The default position should be that foreign state-owned
companies are subject to the criminal jurisdiction of U.S. courts,
at least with respect to their commercial activities. More difficult
questions will arise in investigations and prosecutions involving
non-commercial conduct that other countries would view as
entitled to jurisdictional immunity, and for which the United
States might wish to assert immunity on behalf of its agencies or
instrumentalities if the roles were reversed.
In addition to clarifying that the FSIA does not confer blanket
immunity on foreign state-owned entities from actions that are not
civil in nature, Congress could take several actions. First,
Congress could, in the definition of “foreign state” in
§ 1603(b)(2), differentiate between state-owned enterprises and
“organs” of a foreign state. Or it could remove SOEs from the
scope of § 1603 altogether. If it chose this route, it could add
language to ensure that the FSIA’s long-arm provisions continue
to apply to SOEs, and that SOEs can invoke immunity defenses
when exercising sovereign authority.
Second, Congress could draft a statutory framework for
criminal and regulatory proceedings against foreign state-owned
agencies and instrumentalities that accounts for the strong U.S.

26

28 U.S.C. § 1603(d).
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interest in being able to investigate and prosecute a range of
activity with harmful effects in the United States.
Third, with federalism concerns in mind, it could make clear
that criminal or regulatory proceedings can only be initiated by
the Department of Justice, and not by any individual state’s
attorney general.
Fourth, it could clarify the service and personal-jurisdiction
provisions applicable to foreign state-owned companies in the
criminal context, including by endorsing the use of Federal Rule
of Criminal Procedure 4.
Finally, Congress should encourage the Department of Justice
to coordinate more closely with the Department of State when it
brings criminal actions against individuals or entities that are
closely tied to foreign states. Beyond encouragement, Congress
could design reporting requirements for the initiation and conduct
of criminal proceedings that arguably fall within a grey zone of
non-governmental activity under the restrictive theory. This
reporting would enable Congress to better perform its oversight
and coordination functions in an area situated at the intersection
of economic policy, foreign relations, national security, and law
enforcement.
Conclusion
The FSIA has generally served the U.S. interest in depoliticizing immunity determinations, but it left important issues
unaddressed that Congress should now resolve. Most importantly,
Congress—and, pending new legislation, the courts—should
clarify that the FSIA does not deprive U.S. courts of the ability to
exercise criminal jurisdiction over defendants or subpoena targets
that happen to be owned by foreign states.
*

*

*

